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PROLEGOMENON TO ANY FUTURE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
COURSE: SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE 
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION 
GARY LAWSON* 
Federal constitutional law has a way of worming itself into just about 
every crevice of the law school curriculum.  Civil Procedure students grapple 
with the Due Process Clauses, Property students ponder the Takings Clause, 
and Torts students must reckon with issues of federal preemption and 
legislative power.  But few courses outside the mainstream Constitutional Law 
curriculum require as much sustained attention to constitutional issues as does 
Administrative Law.1  Administrative Law courses typically involve an 
extensive study of procedural due process.2  They also engage, at least 
peripherally, in some of the most fundamental and long-lived constitutional 
controversies in the law of federal jurisdiction, ranging from the law of 
standing,3 to the permissible scope of adjudication by non-Article III bodies,4 
to the extent of Congress’s power to insulate governmental decision making 
from judicial review.5  Most importantly, Administrative Law is the primary 
curricular vehicle for exploring what can loosely be called separation of 
powers law: the law governing the structure of, and the allocation of authority 
among, the various institutions of the national government.  It would be 
remarkably easy to spend the entire course on these topics, and it is remarkably 
 
* Professor, Boston University School of Law. 
 1. Note to Criminal Procedure mavens: I said “few courses,” not “no courses.”  You folks 
win hands down.  See William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1227, 1295 n.250 (1988) (“Criminal procedure courses spend the bulk of a semester (sometimes a 
year) on constitutional restraints on state investigation and prosecution of crime.”). 
 2. See, e.g., GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 357–498 (2d ed. 2001); 
PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 767–901 (10th ed. 
2003). 
 3. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 4. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).  For a 
recent summary of the chaos in this field, and a noble and impressive (even if ultimately 
unpersuasive) attempt to resolve it, see James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, 
and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004). 
 5. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
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difficult to conduct an Administrative Law class that does not spend a sizable 
percentage of its allotted time on such constitutional issues. 
My focus in this Article is on how to teach the law of separation of powers 
in Administrative Law courses.  This task poses a number of significant 
pedagogical puzzles for teachers and students alike.  In terms of case 
outcomes, how does one explain to students that the President must be able to 
remove at will the postmaster (first class) of Portland, Oregon,6 but need not be 
able to remove at will a special prosecutor who, in her defined sphere of 
jurisdiction, exercises more power than does the Attorney General of the 
United States?7  How does one explain that a special trial judge of the United 
States Tax Court, who merely assists the regular Tax Court judges in their 
duties, is an “Officer[] of the United States”8 under the Appointments Clause9 
but that an administrative law judge, whose word is binding law unless it is 
reversed by the head or heads of an agency, is not?10  And how does one 
explain that the Seventh Amendment’s ringing declaration of the right to jury 
trial in suits at common law11 does not apply as long as Congress makes the 
“suit” triable before a politically controllable administrative tribunal rather 
than a real court?12 
The methodological puzzles are even more vexing.  How does one explain 
why the Supreme Court in one breath mechanistically applies the text of 
constitutional provisions, with apparent disdain for arguments based on the 
consequences of such wooden textualism,13 and in the next breath fluidly 
applies consequentialist arguments, with apparent disdain for the constitutional 
text?14  It is particularly challenging when the Court manages to employ both 
methodologies in cases decided on the same day of the same term.15 
 
 6. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 7. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 9. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 876–92 (1991). 
 10. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133–35 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 12. Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 
442, 455 (1977). 
 13. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 134 (1976): 
  We are also told . . . that Congress had good reason for not vesting in a Commission 
composed wholly of Presidential appointees the authority to administer the Act, since the 
administration of the Act would undoubtedly have a bearing on any incumbent President’s 
campaign for re-election. . . . [S]uch fears, however rational, do not by themselves warrant 
a distortion of the Framers’ work. 
 14. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847–48 (1986): 
[R]esolution of claims such as Schor’s cannot turn on conclusory reference to the 
language of Article III.  Rather, the constitutionality of a given congressional delegation 
of adjudicative functions to a non-Article III body must be assessed by reference to the 
purposes underlying the requirements of Article III.  This inquiry, in turn, is guided by the 
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These two methodologies for deciding separation-of-powers issues—the 
first focusing heavily on deductive arguments from text and the latter focusing 
heavily on arguments from practical consequences—are often described, 
respectively, as “formalism” and “functionalism.”  Perhaps the biggest 
challenge in separation-of-powers doctrine is providing useful accounts of 
these methodologies and of the circumstances under which they are likely to 
appear.  And perhaps the biggest challenge in teaching separation-of-powers 
law is communicating to students something useful about these methodologies 
in one segment of one class day.  It is an important challenge, because if one 
can understand the current domain of each methodology, one can go a long 
way toward understanding the otherwise bizarre pattern of case outcomes that 
one observes. 
The first task is to construct useful definitions of formalism and 
functionalism.  That task is made especially difficult by the notorious inability 
of self-proclaimed advocates of those approaches, in both the courts and the 
academy, to reach anything resembling a consensus about the correct 
understanding of those approaches—not to mention the obscurity that often 
reigns over particular definitions.  Teachers and students in a one-semester 
Administrative Law course do not have the time to engage in detailed 
philosophical and jurisprudential parsing of dozens of conflicting definitions of 
poorly identified methodologies.  Is there any way of cutting through the chaos 
in one class session or less without doing a severe injustice to either approach? 
I believe so, though full disclosure demands the following admission: I am 
a committed (and many would say fanatical) formalist and thus am not a 
neutral observer of the methodological debate that I am about to describe.  I 
consider the following account accurate and objective, but readers can make up 
their own minds. 
The Constitution of 1788,16 as amended, is a set of instructions about how 
to set up and operate a government.  The people who drafted and ratified the 
document no doubt had expectations (possibly conflicting, possibly 
overlapping) regarding the likely consequences of following those instructions.  
But there is a conceptual difference between the instructions on the one hand 
and the consequences, or expectations of consequences, of following those 
instructions on the other.  It is true that consequences or expectations might 
well play a role in interpreting or understanding the instructions, but that still 
 
principle that “practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal 
categories should inform application of Article III.” 
(citations omitted). 
 15. Compare id. at 847–48, 851, with Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726–34 (1986). 
 16. At least part of the Constitution became law for nine states on June 21, 1788.  Gary 
Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 
1 (2001). 
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leaves room for a clear distinction between the instructions and the 
consequences. 
Formalism chooses the instructions rather than the consequences or 
expectations as the starting point for reasoning about federal governmental 
structure.  Formalism takes the provisions of the Constitution of 1788 as the 
major premises of reasoning about separation of powers and tries to deduce 
from those premises subsidiary propositions about the constitutionality of 
various institutions and practices.  Formalism thus follows what ordinary 
people, uncorrupted by advanced degrees, would likely regard as the standard 
model of constitutional reasoning: take the Constitution of 1788, place it 
alongside the governmental institution in question, and determine whether the 
latter is consistent with the former.  The Constitution of 1788 is the starting 
point in this reasoning.  It is the baseline against which modern institutions and 
practices must be judged.  In principle, any modern institution is fair game for 
invalidation under a formalist approach.  In practice, virtually the entire 
structure of the modern administrative state is either suspect or flagrantly 
unconstitutional under any plausible formalist account.17 
Functionalism reverses the order of the argument.  Functionalism starts 
with the constitutionality of some important subset of modern institutions as 
the major premise of constitutional argument about governmental structure.  
Propositions about these institutions serve functionalism as postulates—that is, 
as propositions that must be accepted as true by any viable constitutional 
theory.  There are three, and perhaps four, such propositions that together 
constitute the basic contours of functionalism: 
1. The federal government has near-plenary regulatory power, or at least 
enough regulatory power to reach manufacturing, contracting, and most 
economic activity. 
2. Congress has near-plenary power to delegate its near-plenary legislative 
power to other actors. 
3. Congress may combine legislative, executive, and judicial functions in 
a single administrative entity. 
4. It is permissible to insulate administrative decision makers from 
political influence. 
Together, these propositions define the modern administrative state.  If one 
rejects any of these propositions, one will inflict major damage on modern 
institutions of governance.  If Congress is limited only to regulation of 
“Commerce among the several States” (where “Commerce” means 
 
 17. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1231, 1231 (1994); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative 
State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11 (1994). 
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“Commerce” and not “all gainful economic activity”),18 and/or cannot issue 
vacuous commands to administrators but must itself make the important 
legislative decisions,19 and/or cannot allow administrative bodies freedom to 
cross the lines among legislative, executive, and judicial power, then nothing 
remotely resembling modern administrative government could survive.  
Everybody knows this.20  It is less clear that rejection of the fourth principle—
insulation of administrators from political control—is absolutely necessary to 
modern governance.  If independent agencies were ruled unconstitutional 
tomorrow, it would require some reworking of modern institutions, but the 
world as we know it would go on.  But the first three propositions are clearly 
constitutive of modern American government, and the fourth is long enough 
established to merit at least an honorable mention. 
For functionalists, these propositions, and the modern institutions that they 
validate, are the baseline against which the Constitution, or at least 
constitutional theory, must be judged.  Any theory of constitutional 
interpretation, either in general or of a particular clause, that challenges these 
basic postulates and thus leads to the invalidation of a substantial portion of the 
modern administrative state is by definition wrong under functionalism.  The 
whole point of functionalism, in other words, is to provide a constitutional 
justification for the modern administrative state.  The constitutionality of the 
basic institutions of modern governance is the starting point of functionalist 
constitutional argument rather than a testable, and possibly false, conclusion.  
This explains why functionalism is so hard to pin down as a methodology.  It is 
not in fact a single methodology (though various functionalists might indeed be 
committed to various methodologies that are consistent with, though not 
entailed by, functionalism), but it is instead a set of conclusions about what 
must be constitutionally permissible. 
Although ordinary people, again uncorrupted by advanced degrees, might 
find it odd to reason backwards from conclusions to premises, academics with 
corrupting degrees a’ plenty will recognize this approach from numerous other 
contexts.  Many theologians do not consider God’s goodness to be an open 
question.  They take God’s goodness as a given, and if there seems to be 
 
 18. See generally Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001). 
 19. See generally Gary Lawson, Discretion As Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of 
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (2005); Gary Lawson, Delegation and 
Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002). 
 20. For a refreshingly frank admission, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 
(1989) (“[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly 
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply 
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”). 
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evidence that calls this goodness into question, the evidence must be made to 
conform to the theory of God rather than vice versa.21  In the realm of 
epistemology, Immanuel Kant did not ask whether it was possible to have the 
kind of knowledge of mathematics and physics that ordinary people regard as 
uncontroversial but rather took such knowledge as a starting point.22  In a 
move known as the transcendental deduction, he then sought to construct a 
theory of knowledge that showed how such knowledge was possible.23  More 
recently, the same methods, with some modest modifications, were employed 
by John Rawls to try to legitimate the modern welfare state.  For Rawls, the 
legitimacy of the redistributive state is (at least in the first instance) a premise 
rather than a conclusion of political theory—the task of political theory is to 
explain how that conclusion is validated.24  Under this approach, the cherished 
beliefs of Ivy League liberals are not objects of investigation that might 
actually prove to be wrong, but they are instead the standards by which 
theories must be judged (though if the only theory that will yield such beliefs is 
just too absurd even for the sensibilities of Ivy League liberals, that sends us 
into “reflective equilibrium,” where the Ivy League liberal must ultimately 
decide wherein truth resides).25 
Functionalism similarly starts with a specific conclusion—the basic 
institutions of the modern administrative state are constitutional—and then 
seeks to build a theory around that conclusion.  Any theory that does not yield 
that particular conclusion is by definition a bad constitutional theory.  There is 
ample precedent in the history of thought for this mode of reasoning.  That 
does not make it good reasoning, but it does establish at a minimum that it is 
not bizarre or inexplicable reasoning. 
Does that mean that, for functionalists, every institution of the modern 
administrative state is by definition constitutional?  Not at all.  It means only 
that certain core institutions of the modern administrative state such as a 
national government of near-plenary powers, the permissibility of broad 
delegations to agencies, and the combination of legislative, executive, and 
judicial functions in administrative agencies are off the table.  These 
institutions are constitutional by definition, literally by definition, as they 
 
 21. Note to philosophers of religion who consider this a gross mischaracterization of the 
complex enterprise of theodicy: Yes, yes, but remember that we have to teach this stuff in one 
class session or less, so get over it. 
 22. See IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENON TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS 22–23 (Lewis 
White Beck ed. 1950). 
 23. Note to epistemologists who object to a one-sentence definition of one of the most 
complex constructs in the history of thought: Yes, yes, but remember that we have to teach this 
stuff in one class session or less, so get over it. 
 24. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19–21, 579–80 (1971). 
 25. See id. at 47–50. 
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define the practical meaning of the Constitution.  But other, less fundamental 
institutions can be unconstitutional under functionalism if they are inconsistent 
with either the logical implications of the core institutions, the text of the 
Constitution, or whatever is regarded as relevant for constitutional meaning 
when the integrity of modern governance is not at stake.  For instance, 
functionalists can agree wholeheartedly with formalists that Congress cannot 
directly appoint executive officials.26  This conclusion in no way threatens the 
basic integrity of modern administrative governance, and it does not call into 
question the legitimacy of the core institutions of the modern state.  
Functionalists might even be able to agree with formalists that the legislative 
veto is unconstitutional.27  Invalidating the legislative veto certainly sent 
shockwaves through the government, but it did not seriously threaten the 
integrity of the basic institutions of modern governance.  The administrative 
state trundles along with or without legislative vetoes.  Indeed, legislative 
vetoes might even be inconsistent with the core premises of modern 
governance if one regards them as an undue extension of political influence 
into the agency process.  Functionalists, it seems to me, can go either way on 
the legislative veto and still be good functionalists.  Finally, functionalists need 
not object to the Supreme Court’s recent modest revival of the doctrine of 
enumerated powers.  Rulings that Congress cannot enact the Violence Against 
Women Act28 or the Gun-Free School Zones Act29 simply do not affect the 
missions of mainstream federal agencies as long as the holdings are confined 
to the periphery of non-economic activity, as they seem to be thus far.  If the 
Court were once again to hold that manufacturing is not commerce within the 
meaning of Article I, section 8,30 that would be inconsistent with 
functionalism, but no one expects any such thing to happen. 
The mystery of the Supreme Court’s apparent vacillation between 
formalism and functionalism can now be solved.  There is no vacillation.  The 
Court is solidly, consistently, unshakably functionalist.  When the basic 
institutions of modern administrative governance are at stake, the Court closes 
ranks and hurls the constitutional text into the Potomac River.  When 
subsidiary institutions are at stake, the various Justices are free to indulge their 
own interpretative preferences, which for some involve deductive application 
of textual instructions and for others involve reasoning from consequences.  
One can, if one wishes, use “formalism” and “functionalism” to describe the 
various methodological approaches at work in these subsidiary cases—as long 
 
 26. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 27. See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 28. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 29. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 30. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1895). 
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as one does not try to put such cases in the same category as those that 
challenge basic institutions of governance. 
Thus, formalism and functionalism are distinguished more by their starting 
points than by the methods of reasoning that are employed once those starting 
points are established.  So where do methods of reasoning fit in?  To what 
extent are formalism and functionalism tied to more general theories of 
constitutional interpretation? 
When discussing formalism, I have been careful to refer always to the 
“Constitution of 1788.”  Does that mean that formalism is necessarily an 
originalist position?  The question is more complicated than it might first seem.  
Not all originalists are formalists, and not all nonoriginalists are functionalists 
(or, put another way, not all formalists are originalists and not all functionalists 
are nonoriginalists).  Formalists and functionalists alike can be either 
originalist or nonoriginalist in their basic orientation.  The fundamental 
question is whether they take the core institutions of modern administrative 
governance as an object or starting point of constitutional inquiry. 
Justice Scalia, for instance, is properly classified as an originalist 
functionalist although he is generally regarded as an arch-formalist.  His 
general interpretative orientation is originalist,31 but he does not regard the 
constitutionality of basic institutions of modern administrative governance as 
open to inquiry.  That is clear with respect to the nondelegation doctrine,32 and 
he has indicated no desire to revisit the foundational cases for the modern 
expansion of federal power.33  On the other side, Professor Martin Redish is a 
prime example of a nonoriginalist formalist.  Professor Redish rejects 
originalism (or at least what he understands to be originalism)34 while being 
willing to take on even the most established premises of modern administrative 
governance, such as the nondelegation doctrine35 or the combination of 
functions within agencies.36 
Of course, there is more than a small amount of contingent overlap 
between originalism and formalism on the one hand and nonoriginalism and 
 
 31. See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 
(1989). 
 32. See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 33. In this respect, he is most unlike Justice Thomas, who is the lone current Justice who 
might properly be called a formalist.  See Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1949–51 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing doubts about the soundness of modern Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence); American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing 
willingness to reconsider the Court’s nondelegation doctrine precedents). 
 34. MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 6–16 (1995). 
 35. See id. at 136–37. 
 36. E-mail from Martin Redish, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law 
(Jan. 3, 2005) (on file with author). 
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functionalism on the other.  From an originalist standpoint, the Constitution of 
1788 was constructed precisely to prevent the emergence of anything 
resembling the modern administrative state.  To get to where we are today 
required the systematic dismantling of virtually all of the structural provisions 
written into the original document.  An originalist can be a functionalist only 
by choosing precedent over the Constitution (as has Justice Scalia) or by 
applying originalism badly.  But there are plenty of originalists out there who 
are willing to do either or both of these things, so one cannot draw a direct line 
between originalism and formalism. 
The relationship between nonoriginalism and functionalism is a bit more 
complicated, simply because “nonoriginalism” is not a theory of interpretation.  
It is a term that refers to a whole class of theories of interpretation that are 
united only by what they oppose.  As Professor Redish demonstrates, one 
certainly can be a nonoriginalist formalist if one believes, for instance, that 
there are sound normative reasons, having nothing to do with any theory of 
original meaning, for adhering to the Constitution of 1788’s basic structural 
scheme.  In the real world, nonoriginalist formalists such as Professor Redish 
are very rare.  But that is purely a contingent consequence of the interpretative 
theories that nonoriginalists select. 
So yes, it is possible to say something useful about separation-of-powers 
doctrine in a fashion that is less daunting, even if only slightly so, than, for 
example, the Critique of Pure Reason.37  The most important point to keep in 
mind about the story is that one has already gotten a very good peek at the 
ending. 
 
 37. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (F. Max Müller trans. 1966). 
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